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Pass the Ammunition: a short etymology of ‘blockbuster’ 
 
This article stems from a long-standing interest in the etymology, or linguistic history, 
of film-industry and showbusiness terminology. In particular, I became interested 
some time ago in the origins and use of the now-ubiquitous word ‘blockbuster’. Its 
use today – indeed, overuse – tends to be in connection with what I and Steve Neale, 
in our recent book, Epics, Spectacles, and Blockbusters: A Hollywood History, refer 
to as ‘unusually expensive productions designed to earn unusually large amounts of 
money’1 – that is to say, films which are not just exceptionally successful box-office 
hits but those which are specifically intended to be so, and are budgeted, made and 
marketed accordingly. However, while scholars and critics may attempt a certain 
precision in its use, popular usage is far less circumspect. In my experience as a 
university film studies tutor, ‘blockbuster’ is often assumed to be synonymous with 
the contemporary action film, the genre in which the largest sums are typically 
invested today and which often heads the box-office charts. Furthermore, it is not 
unusual to find ‘civilians’ (those moviegoers who are not members of the academic 
film community or minority film culture) describing virtually any and every 
Hollywood movie as a blockbuster, intuitively regarding the word as a synonym for 
the kind of mainstream entertainment the American film industry typically produces 
irrespective of genre. (In much the same way, ‘Hollywood’ itself is sometimes taken 
to stand for the whole of the film industry rather than the major American 
corporations in particular.) 
     In researching my share of Epics, Spectacles, and Blockbusters I attempted to 
locate the first uses of ‘blockbuster’ in the American trade press – in particular, the 
major showbusiness newspaper Variety – as a way of tracing its adoption into film-
industry vernacular. Additional research clarified the word’s extra-cinematic origins 
(of which more later). My extensive searches of Variety – which were initially 
confined to its weekly editions, more readily available on microfilm in UK libraries 
than the daily version – suggested that the ‘original’ use of the term in its modern 
sense occurred in the journal’s review of Quo Vadis (1951) in the weekly issue of 14 
November 1951, which described the film as ‘a b.o. blockbuster [...] right up there 
with Birth of a Nation and Gone With the Wind for boxoffice performance [...] a 
super-spectacle in all its meaning’.2 But I was subsequently alerted to an earlier use 
by Jeffrey Richards’s book Hollywood’s Ancient Worlds, which quotes a review from 
the British Daily Mirror, dated 22 December 1950, of Cecil B. DeMille’s Samson and 
Delilah (1949), predicting it, too, to be ‘a box office block buster’.3 The strikingly 
similar vocabulary suggested a longer history to the film-specific use of the term than 
I had anticipated, and the recent digitisation of the Variety archive made viable a more 
detailed word search than could be achieved with microfilm.4  
     Thus it has been possible to construct a reasonably accurate history of 
‘blockbuster’ before the mid-1950s, by which time it had become recognised and 
accepted by both the trade press and the film industry at large as betokening the kinds 
of film identified above: one which would ‘gross $2,000,000 or more in domestic 
(U.S. and Canada) rentals’ as well as ‘a relatively expensive picture that can head the 
program in all situations’.5 Both these definitions are taken from Variety’s reports of 
United Artists’ own categorisation of its product, in 1954 and 1957 respectively. In its 
annual surveys the journal identified 1953 as ‘a year of boxoffice blockbusters’, with 
135 releases grossing $1,000,000 or over compared to 119 in 1952, and 1958 
similarly as ‘the year of the blockbusters for the picture business’.6 Heading the 
revenue chart in 1953 was The Robe (1953) and in 1958, The Bridge on the River 
Kwai (1957), which, along with The Ten Commandments (1956) and Around the 
World in Eighty Days (1956), that year joined Gone with the Wind (1939) and The 
Robe to top the annually updated ‘All-Time B.O. Champs’ list. All these secured the 
common understanding of the blockbuster as a ‘kingsize’ picture, large in scale, 
spectacle, cost and income, as well as wide in scope (or ’Scope) and long in running 
time (all five films ran between two-and-a-quarter and three-and-three-quarter hours). 
 
Origins 
In teaching about the blockbuster, I often pose students the question of how the word 
originated and what it first referred to. Their answers often echo those that I suggested 
to myself before beginning sustained research into the matter. They typically hinge on 
the understanding, in the context of cinema history, of the ‘block’ prefix.7 One sense 
of this is in relation to the common practice, prior to 1948 (and especially up to 1940), 
of block booking: that system of distribution, on which the dominance of the eight 
major Hollywood corporations depended, in which the exhibitor client was obliged to 
book an entire year’s output from a major studio rather than being free to choose only 
the particular picture or pictures desired.8 Within a block package, it was common for 
the distributor to nominate a small number of films as ‘specials’ or, less frequently, 
‘superspecials’: big-budget or prestige productions which would carry a higher-than-
average price tag in terms of the proportion of box-office income demanded by way 
of rental. In some cases, a particular attraction might not be offered as part of a block 
at all, but instead be sold singly and only to those select clientele in whose theatres the 
film could best be presented, possibly on a ‘roadshow’ or high-priced, exclusive pre-
release basis. Such films – which included, for example, Gone with the Wind – 
correspond closely to our modern understanding of what a blockbuster film is. 
However, by the time the term entered common parlance, the era of block booking 
was over. After the 1940 Consent Decree, block booking was limited to groups of five 
and in the 1948 Paramount, et al., decrees the practice was outlawed altogether and 
every film had to be sold singly, without being conditional on the booking of another 
picture. So however much we might now want to describe pre-1948 superproductions 
as blockbusters, that is not how they would have been known at the time. 
     A second, more directly relevant, sense of ‘block’ is that of a city block. Trade 
advertisements for films in the 1930s and 1940s frequently included illustrations 
showing long queues of patrons waiting outside theatres for the chance of admission, 
with such lines often extending around the block of buildings on which the theatre 
was located.9 It is not unreasonable to assume that ‘blockbuster’ referred to a film so 
popular as to attract round-the-block queues, but again the term was never used in this 
way. In fact, the word does not owe its origins to the film or entertainment industries 
at all, so does not derive from any habitual trade practices. Its first use in the film 
trade press, in 1943, was purely opportunistic, on the basis of its topicality and current 
newsworthiness. 
     In that year, the Allied air forces began to employ a type of heavy explosive shell 
in the bombing of military and industrial targets in Nazi-occupied Europe. Newspaper 
reports of its being tested had appeared the year before and subsequent press coverage 
described the extensive damage it inflicted on cities and factories. The nickname 
given to these large bombs, typically weighing 4,000 pounds or 8,000 pounds, was 
‘blockbuster’, indicating their capacity for large-scale destruction: a bomb powerful 
enough to demolish an entire city block. John Huston’s documentary Report from the 
Aleutians (1943) includes footage of 1,000-pound bombs being loaded onto U.S. 
aircraft, while Huston’s voice-over narration explains the strategic use of such 
‘blockbusters’ for carpet-bombing large or scattered targets. The 8,000-pounder (over 
five tons) was the largest aerial bomb ever deployed until February 1944, when the 
R.A.F. introduced the 12,000-pound ‘factory buster’, and it was superseded again 
when in August 1945 American air crews dropped the first atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki – weapons reportedly nicknamed ‘city-busters’ by the 
Chicago Sun-Times.10 Perhaps it should also be mentioned here that the UK’s biggest 
box-office hit of 1955 was named after another weapon used in a famous wartime 
aerial mission: The Dam Busters. 
     The earliest use I have been able to locate of ‘blockbuster’ to describe a motion 
picture occurs in trade advertisements placed in Variety and Motion Picture Herald, 
and presumably also in other contemporaneous trade publications, in May 1943 for 
RKO’s war film Bombardier (1943). The tagline reads: ‘The block-buster of all 
action-thrill-service shows!’.11 (Blockbuster was often hyphenated or written as two 
separate words in this period.) As the film’s title indicates, the choice of metaphor 
was a deliberate play on the story’s dramatic content, which concerns a squadron of 
trainee bombardiers and climaxes with an aerial assault on Japanese munitions 
factories. Another trade advertisement for a war-themed film, the documentary With 
the Marines at Tarawa  (1944), describes its emotional impact by way of analogy: ‘It 
hits the heart like a two ton blockbuster!’12 An appeal for industry support for a fund-
raising campaign similarly invoked the image of a large bomb, and was accompanied 
by a graphic illustration showing a shell landing on the flag of Japan: ‘Let’s make the 
6th War Loan a six-ton block-buster!’13 The publicists were here drawing specifically 
upon industry readers’ presumed awareness of the blockbuster bomb, its current 
prominence in the public mind and its connotations of massive impact. 
     Not surprisingly, reporters, reviewers and editorial copy-writers for the trade press 
also began to exploit the word for its shorthand descriptive vividness, albeit as a way 
of indicating commercial potential rather than a role in the war effort. Thus MGM’s 
combat film Bataan (1943) was trumpeted in the company’s house organ The Lion’s 
Roar as ‘a block-buster to scatter those wise guys in the industry and the press who 
are always telling us that the public won’t support war films.’14 Paramount’s No Time 
for Love (1944) was described by Boxoffice magazine as a ‘comedy block-buster. 
Theatre grosses should be blown to ceiling heights.’15 Variety’s review of the musical 
Brazil (1944) predicted that it would ‘prove a block-buster at the wickets, a musical 
investment for Republic that promises to out-gross any previous top-bracket film from 
this company.’16 In all these instances, ‘blockbuster’ has been added to the already 
extensive trade vocabulary for describing hits (a word whose own associations with 
the effect of military ordinance hardly need to be stressed) in martial terms. A further 
example can be adduced from another article in The Lion’s Roar: ‘Behind the big 
guns that fire the loudest box-office salvoes in the industry must be men who know 
how to load them with the industry’s most potent ammunition.’17 
     The potency of the blockbuster bomb as a metaphor or simile for the film trade 
seems, however, to have been limited by its immediate topicality. Once its novelty 
value and wartime currency had expired, after 1944 the word ceased to appear in 
advertising or editorial copy.18 The reason for its obsolescence is suggested by a line 
quoted in a trade advertisement for CBS’s experimental colour television service in 
1946: ‘I think it obsoletes [sic] black-and-white as the ATOM Bomb made Block 
busters obsolete.’19 The much more powerful image of nuclear destruction, as well as 
the cessation of hostilities, had seemingly rendered the blockbuster outdated as a 
descriptive analogy as well as an actual weapon by the end of the war. One quaint 
reference in 1946 would have been most appreciated by readers with long memories, 
when an MGM publicist reassured Variety’s gossip columnist that Elizabeth Taylor’s 
first screen kiss, in Rich Full Life (1946), would be only a ‘peck, not a blockbuster’.20 
 
Postwar Conflict and Competition 
After a hiatus of several years, ‘blockbuster’ reappeared in Variety reportage in 1948, 
in two articles announcing programmes of forthcoming releases from the major 
studios. In April, Daily Variety led its survey of the year’s upcoming pictures with 
several MGM films ‘packed with stars’, including Words and Music, Homecoming, 
State of the Union and The Three Musketeers, and a further group of ‘Leo’s 
Blockbusters’ headed by Command Decision.21 In December, in an article listing 
sixty-five big-budget films in the pipeline, the daily noted that 20th Century-Fox’s 
‘blockbusters are The Black Rose, $3,500,000; Lydia Bailey, $3,000,000; The Snake 
Pit, $2,700,000; and Prince of Foxes, Twelve O’Clock High, Down to the Sea in Ships 
and The Beautiful Blonde from Bashful Bend, $2,000,000 apiece.’22 Here we have at 
work the twin definitions of blockbuster which still hold sway: potentially successful 
releases and high-cost productions. Though Command Decision is, like Bombardier 
five years before, thematically suited to the description of blockbuster – an adaptation 
of a successful Broadway play about wartime bombing missions, it was one of the 
first postwar films to return to a World War Two setting after it had been deemed 
box-office poison due to the public’s satiation with war pictures during the conflict – 
it was not the only film mentioned in that category; others listed alongside it included 
comedies, musicals and crime thrillers.23 Instead the term had begun to acquire a more 
general significance unrelated either to a time of literal conflict (intensive aerial 
bombing campaigns held no relevance to America’s subsequent involvement in the 
Korean War) or to specific story material. Subsequent iterations in trade discourse 
over the next three years confirmed this. 
     Curiously, the version of the April article which appeared in the weekly, rather 
than the daily, edition of Variety (it was common for the weekly paper to reprint or 
revise articles that first appeared in the daily) did not use the word blockbuster. It did, 
however, likewise pursue a wartime analogy. The opening paragraph reads as follows:  
Paced by Metro, studios are rushing to aid the sagging b.o. with the 
biggest array of star-studded pix in Hollywood history. The next 12 
months will see the industry’s big guns fired in a simultaneous barrage 
designed to crumble stiffening buyer opposition, and to hasten return of 
healthy business.24 
The tone of this passage, which is taken up by other contemporaneous articles and 
many more in the next few years to come, gives an indication of the state of mind 
which was increasingly taking over the industry and its press at this time. It suggests a 
siege mentality and a related commitment to an aggressive form of defence. To 
understand the reasons for this, brief contextualisation of the postwar era as it was 
experienced by the entertainment industry is necessary. 
     As is well known, Hollywood faced a number of crises in the late 1940s and early 
1950s. The most pressing of these in commercial terms (setting to one side the 
investigations of supposed Communist influence in the film industry undertaken by 
the House UnAmerican Activities Committee) were (1) the results of the Supreme 
Court decision, handed down in May 1948, in the long-running antitrust case, which 
enforced the divorcement and divestiture of the theatre chains owned by the ‘Big 
Five’ major corporations, thereby depriving them of one source of profit; (2) the 
initially gradual but increasingly precipitous decline in domestic theatre admissions as 
the greater availability of both disposable income and affordable consumer durables, 
the greater variety of postwar leisure options and the population shift to an 
increasingly middle-class, suburban base all combined to draw potential audiences 
away from the cinema. In five years, according to one report, attendance declined by 
one-third, from a peak of around 80 million admissions per week in 1946 to 53 
million in 1951.25 
     The antitrust action was the most visible manifestation of the long-standing 
hostility to the major producer-distributors of sections of the independent exhibitors 
(those not owned by or affiliated to the majors) who depended on them for a regular 
supply of product. It was the resentment against certain entrenched trade practices 
(such as block booking) on the part of some of these exhibitors that led them to urge 
the Department of Justice to investigate illegal collusion and unfair competition 
within the industry and ultimately to the Consent Decrees, signed by RKO in 1948, 
Paramount in 1949 and Fox, Warner Bros. and Loew’s (the parent company of MGM) 
in 1950, that drew a line under the vertically integrated studio system. The ultimate 
result of the court action was not, however, to the universal benefit of independent 
exhibitors. While they had hoped to gain greater freedom in film bookings and 
consequent economic benefits from the ruling, they found instead to their cost that the 
majors had other ways of retaining control over the market than outright ownership of 
theatres. One of these was the practice of competitive bidding, or auction selling, for 
top product, which had actually been introduced at the behest of the New York district 
court in its own ruling on the antitrust case in June 1946.26 Under this system, rival 
exhibitors in each area were forced to bid against one another for the right to show the 
most desirable new pictures in first run. By law, the picture had to go to the highest 
bidder, but offers were made ‘blind’ (that is, bidders were not permitted to know what 
their rivals had bid) so in order to be sure of securing a picture, exhibitors were 
obliged to offer terms highly favourable to the distributors. Variety had reported in 
late 1948 that, rather than being liberated by divorcement, exhibitors were now afraid 
that it would make distribution the dominant sector of the industry, with the majors 
able to demand higher rentals for fewer films since they were no longer obliged to 
keep their own theatres supplied. This threatened to leave exhibitors with a product 
shortage, higher operating costs and increased competition, both from each other and 
from rival forms of recreation, including television.27 
     As an alternative form of audio-visual entertainment and the newest arrival on the 
leisure-time scene following its postwar introduction in 1946, network television was 
of course the most conspicuous rival for audience loyalty. In 1948 Variety reported 
general agreement among exhibitors that TV was still not yet a significant threat to 
the film box office, and that any such future threat would be temporary until the 
novelty of the new medium wore off, as had happened previously with radio. But the 
same year a survey of 270 families in Long Island, New York, found that 20 per cent 
of those owning television sets visited cinemas less often than those without, and 58 
per cent attended less often than they had before purchasing the TV. The survey 
suggested a national annual loss of rental income of $3,400,000 if the same were true 
for the whole country.28 This was of course if the present proportion of TV ownership 
remained constant; but in the next few years it grew exponentially, as did the 
television broadcasting industry itself.  
     Writing in the Variety anniversary of 2 January 1952, looking back like other 
contributors on the trends and patterns of the year just gone, Frieda Hennock noted: 
There were many outstanding events in TV during 1951. Perhaps the most 
fundamental and far-reaching change was found in the balance sheets of 
the 108 TV stations now on the air. Telecasting finally climbed out of the 
pit of unprofitable operation; black ink came widely into use and the red 
was happily stored away, let us hope forever, by the majority of 
broadcasters. Choice nighttime was already SRO [standing room only], 
with this condition spreading to other time segments. Television had 
become, in Variety lingo, ‘a B.O. Blockbuster.’29 
The reference here to ‘blockbuster’ as being part of the journal’s characteristically 
idiosyncratic, idiomatic vocabulary offers confirmation both that Variety itself was 
most likely responsible for the term’s renewed currency, and that it was applied by the 
journal as much to television and to other areas of showbusiness, including popular 
music and radio, as to the cinema. Thus in 1949, Dean Martin and Jerry Lewis’s new 
show on the NBC radio network was said to face ‘the rugged competition of the front 
end of Columbia’s blockbusters’. Another report identified the source of this 
competition as ‘CBS’s new Sunday comedy blockbuster’ fronted by Red Skelton.30 In 
reporting on the competition for viewers between the television networks in the new 
1951-52 season, Variety ran the headline ‘NBC-TV’s Blockbustin’ Lineup; Net’s 
Torpedoes Trained on CBS’. For CBS’s response to its rival, an article on the same 
page adopted a pugilistic rather than a militaristic metaphor: ‘CBS Prepping Big 
Sunday Punches to Right-Cross NBC’s “Big Show”’.31 
     The important point to note here is the repeated emphasis on rivalry, competition 
and conflict, terms in which ‘blockbuster’ seems to play a regular and representative 
role. Similarly aggressive terminology abounds in trade journalism and advertising 
throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s. Variety’s previews of upcoming product, 
cited above, are also instances. In March 1949 the journal noted that a deliberate drive 
by 20th Century-Fox ‘to hoist film rentals another 25% shows signs of developing into 
an offensive by all the majors for bigger returns in distribution [...]  indications this 
week point to a determination by the other companies to stay abreast the growing 
battle. The entire industry is gearing for what may be the bitterest exhib-distrib fracas 
in many years.’ The paper stated that:  
the campaign is expected to touch off an unprecedented string of attacks 
from exhib organizations. With the growing tension, every theatre group, 
ranging from Allied to Theatre Owners of America, will line up in an 
effort to stave off distrib assault on rentals. Already the opening gun has 
been fired in the form of a challenge by Harry Brandt’s Independent 
Theatre Owners of America to 20th’s Spyros Skouras, Al Lichtman, and 
Any W. Smith, Jr., for a full-dress debate.32 
     The intensified pressure on the film industry to fight the inroads of television 
provides one explanation for the hostile tone. In August 1950 Variety again reported 
on an upcoming product lineup in which ‘Hollywood will unleash its biggest guns’ in 
order ‘to revive a lagging boxoffice’: 
Spectacle, adventure, music, comedy and romance have been molded into 
mass appeal yarns and united with boxoffice stars, color and the top 
production know-how to give one of the greatest mass attacks on TV yet 
provided.33 
This pattern is noticeable also in ad campaigns run by several of the majors. In a four-
page preview of its new releases for the first four months of 1951, Paramount used 
language identical to that of Variety’s reporter. As well as the slogan ‘The Big Gun: 
Paramount in ’51’ the ad included a banner headline, ‘First Hits in a Year-Long 
Boxoffice Barrage’ and the sub-headline ‘Manpowered by the strongest army of talent 
ever recruited at one studio’. A logo depicting a cannon appearing to fire an 
exclamation mark appeared on the first page and, in miniature, alongside the title of 
each film to be released (nine in all, including the wide general release of Samson and 
Delilah, claimed as being already ‘the Greatest Grosser of Our Time’ from its 
roadshow engagements).34 In June and July of the same year 20th Century-Fox ran a 
series of advertisements in Variety on the theme of ‘The Industry’s New Rallying 
Cry: Let’s Attack Together!’. The first ad in this series continued: ‘A new fighting 
spirit’s in the air! A new smile’s on Showmen’s faces! 20th passes the ammo... and the 
big offensive is on!’.35 The series culminated in an eight-page splash in the 4 July 
issue, which included the text: 
we’ve got the ammunition! Powered by the leadership that set off the 
industry’s showmanship crusade ... and told the world the movies are the 
greatest of all entertainment! Once again 20th comes through with a 
tremendous barrage of hits – supported by the know-how that made a 
showmanship famous! The industry’s biggest offensive is on! Let’s attack 
together!!!36 
     This ad series, aside from trailing the studio’s new releases for the rest of the year, 
including ‘special engagements’ of the biblical epic David and Bathsheba (1951), was 
dedicated to a show of unity with exhibitors, who had only recently been regarded by 
the formerly integrated studios as the enemy (due to the antitrust proceedings) rather 
than as allies. The copy for the 4 July ad also included the line: ‘We are determined to 
back up our exhibitor friends with every resource at our command.’37 This emphasis 
on friendship rather than enmity, on mutual support rather than rivalry, was 
undoubtedly an attempt to ameliorate, as per the March 1949 article cited above, a 
potential ‘exhib-distrib fracas’. It diverted attention from the conflict of interest that 
saw exhibitors hoping for greater freedom of choice in what films they booked and, 
crucially, when and on what terms they were able to book them, and producer-
distributors seeking to secure not only a sufficient number of bookings for their 
product but also favourable rental terms to guarantee a profit on their investment and 
to compensate for the decline in theatre admissions. The hostility which resulted from 
the renters’ introduction in 1946 of competitive bidding or auction selling was one 
sign of this conflict, in which movies could be seen not so much as ammunition in a 
common cause as weapons with which one sector of the industry could do battle with 
another. 
 
Weapons of Mass Distribution 
In order to justify auction selling as a way of driving up rentals, the majors needed to 
make available films for which exhibitors would be willing to compete with one 
another and to pay prices favourable to the producer-distributors. In an increasingly 
uncertain marketplace, with audience tastes no longer as predictable nor their 
attendance as reliable as in the recent past, the most attractive commodities for 
exhibitors were those containing proven box-office ingredients, including major stars, 
‘pre-sold’ stories (such as those with a basis in established literary or stage properties, 
or indeed previously successful films) and high production values (the kind of 
spectacle afforded by a big budget). Such films could then be sold to audiences at 
selectively increased admission prices, a practice actively encouraged by the majors 
even though, legally, they could no longer either set admission prices themselves 
(unless hiring a theatre outright on a ‘four-wall’ basis, for which they would need to 
secure court permission) or dictate prices to exhibitor clients, as they had done 
previously. Not all films were sold to exhibitors in this way; indeed, besides the 
inconvenience of the time consumed by receiving and processing bids, only a 
relatively small proportion of any major’s annual output was suited to it and the 
practice therefore tended to be reserved for specials and superspecials. One such, 
though far from the first, was MGM’s release of Quo Vadis.38 
     Costing $7,623,000, Quo Vadis was the most expensive production yet made. 
Following the opening of its premiere engagements in eight key cities including New 
York and Los Angeles, used by MGM to test the market for exhibition policy, the 
film was made available for first-run bookings after 1 January 1952 under strictly 
specified conditions. Exhibitors were required to stipulate guarantees for the 
minimum total sum they would remit to MGM as rental; the minimum length of the 
run they would give the picture; the minimum amount the exhibitor was prepared to 
spend on local advertising following the first week, which MGM would pay for; 
control figures for ‘holdovers’ (that is, the minimum weekly take that would justify 
the booking being retained for a further week); and the admission prices, before tax, at 
which tickets would be sold. MGM’s trade advertisement announcing the sales plan 
carefully set out the justification for its policy on ticket prices: 
We cannot and will not have anything to do with the fixing or 
determination of admission prices; they will be decided by the theatre 
operators and no-one else. [...] The sole purpose in asking for admission 
prices which the exhibitor intends to charge is to enable us to evaluate the 
offers received and thus award the picture on the basis of the best bid. 
Any offer which contains a participation in the gross requires an estimate 
of such receipts for proper appraisal. This estimate, of course, necessitates 
a knowledge of the admission prices prevailing during the engagement. 
The failure to include proposed admission prices in an offer will not 
disqualify the bid, but their inclusion will enable us better to evaluate the 
bids.39 
Distribution agents were not permitted to suggest admission prices but could indicate 
prices charged by other theatres showing the film as a guide for exhibitors making the 
bid.  
     Initially, only theatres situated in communities of over 100,000 in population were 
permitted to bid and even exhibitors not in competitive situations were required to 
submit a satisfactory offer in order to be able to play the picture. As the release 
progressed the film was to be made available for first run to theatres in successively 
smaller communities that would then be invited to bid for it on the same basis, and for 
second and subsequent runs in localities where the film had already played. Under no 
circumstances was it allowed to be shown as part of a double bill, but as Quo Vadis 
ran nearly three hours there was not likely to be any dispute in this particular matter. 
Indeed, although MGM’s sales plan drew protests and even questions as to its legality 
from some exhibitor organisations there was little actual resistance from theatre 
owners themselves. MGM reported being ‘deluged’ by offers, many of them from 
exhibitors outside the largest cities or in other ways contrary to the stipulations of the 
plan.40 As rental, theatres were effectively required to pay around 70 per cent from the 
first dollar of the box-office gross (the top rate paid for the most in-demand pictures 
in the past, including Gone with the Wind, Samson and Delilah and David and 
Bathsheba). Such high terms in effect obliged them to increase their prices for the 
length of the engagement in order to ensure a profit on their operating costs (standard 
booking deals stipulated a rental figure after deduction of costs) and the average 
admission price charged in most first-run theatres was reported as $1.25 at a time 
when the average admission price was under 50 cents.41 Nevertheless, by the end of 
1957 domestic rentals totalled $11,143,000 with overseas earnings of $9,894,000 for a 
total gross of $21,037,000 and a profit of $5,440,000 (thus distribution, marketing and 
other expenses over the six years of first release amounted to $7,974,000).42  
     The success of Quo Vadis and other ‘big pictures’ in the early 1950s set the pattern 
for others still to come, in ever greater numbers and on ever larger budgets. If 
Variety’s designation of the film as a blockbuster in its review of 14 November 1951 
was not the first instance of the use of the word to mean a purpose-built box-office 
giant, it undoubtedly marked a point by which it had become widely recognised and 
accepted into the industry’s vocabulary, and not only in the trade press. The week 
before the journal ran its review, it had quoted MGM production head Dore Schary’s 
disdain for going into partnership with television because of the far greater rewards 
available from the theatrical market:  
‘forgetting those $5,500,000 blockbusters, or even the $3,000,000 and 
$4,000,000 top grossers we’ve been turning out, it’s obvious that [...] the 
millions in potential from orthodox theatre boxoffice exhibition makes TV 
a peanuts operation for the majors anyway. [...] That’s why Metro is 
maintaining its 40-picture schedule. We’re upping the ratio of the so-
called “blockbusters” to 20, that is in color and more costly, and naturally 
hope the other 20, despite the more modest budgets, will likewise measure 
up.’43 
Thus in the space of a single interview Schary used the term to refer both to high-
grossing movies and to high-cost films designed for high earnings, confirming that its 
dual modern sense had already been accepted into the Hollywood lexicon.  
     In February 1952 Schary was again reported, this time according to a Variety 
interview with RCA’s David Sarnoff, as stating that MGM was opposed to dealing 
with television or ‘to further building up “the monster”, which is inimical to the film 
boxoffice; and that the main objective is to produce boxoffice blockbusters or any 
other type of film which will lure them out of the home.’44 This is now the 
commonplace or commonsensical view of the role of the blockbuster in 1950s film 
economics, but it was not regarded without some scepticism or ambivalence at the 
time. In Variety’s anniversary issue (the journal’s annual forum for retrospective and 
topical overviews of showbusiness affairs) of 2 January 1952, no fewer than four 
articles made the point that ‘every entertainment – be it film or round actor – can’t be 
a blockbuster’.45 James R. Grainger, Executive Vice-President of Republic Pictures, 
argued that ‘theatres must have a steady flow of product to keep their screens 
occupied, and every picture can’t be a “blockbuster.” All the producing companies 
together barely make 52 pictures in that category.’ Understandably, given his 
company’s longstanding commitment to B movies and other low-budget 
entertainment, he felt that it was not ‘only “big” pictures [that] do business. In my 
opinion, the picture that does business, whether it is a so-called blockbuster or not, is 
the one which has the entertainment value to which the public responds.’46 
     This point was echoed by veteran producer Hal B. Wallis, now an independent 
based on the Paramount lot, whose current productions included the popular Dean 
Martin and Jerry Lewis series of musical comedies.  
Undoubtedly, the so-called ‘blockbusters,’ colossi like Quo Vadis, 
Samson and Delilah, David and Bathsheba and Greatest Show on Earth 
are great for the business. They attract customers who haven’t been 
around for years and their very exploitation is a stimulant for our industry, 
which thrives on excitement. 
     However, I do not subscribe to a full program of multi-million-dollar 
negative costs. For one, too frequent repetition of this type picture would 
very quickly sate the public. Then consider the grosses rolled up by any 
Martin and Lewis picture [...] and you see why there is still profit possible 
in films that are brought in for a million or less.  
Wallis articulated a widespread concern in the industry over rising production costs – 
the result, variously of the increasing cost of materials, increasing union demands for 
minimum wages and minimum crewing levels, and increasing demands by talent for 
participation in film revenues – at a time when income and profit were under threat. 
He questioned also the value of big budgets as far as the audience was concerned: ‘In 
more than 20 years in this business I have never heard a passing patron at a theatre 
ask, “How much did this picture cost to make?”’47  
     Another highly regarded producer, Stanley Kramer, similarly resisted the imminent 
prospect of industry-wide commitment to the production of the type of films 
designated by the term blockbuster, to the possible exclusion of other kinds of product 
aimed at other kinds of audience, such as the more discriminating over-25s: 
 Obviously the film industry as it has been constituted couldn’t long 
survive just producing blockbusters, which I assume mean pictures that 
are replete with thousands of plunging horses and necklines, plus gigantic, 
spectacular, lavish situations and expenditures of millions of dollars. In 
the final analysis, we are a story-telling medium, and our success depends 
directly on our ability to select and tell stories well. If we must substitute 
size for all of the other well-tested elements that comprise expert story 
telling, we belong to the circus business instead of motion pictures. It is 
possible that a wave of the super-colossal will engulf the industry.48 
‘Colossal’ or ‘super-colossal’ – terms long associated with the scale, spectacle and 
lavish expenditure now identified with ‘blockbuster’ – were also used in the trade 
press to describe Quo Vadis, David and Bathsheba and The Greatest Show on Earth 
(1952), among others. These were indeed just the kinds of production upon which 
Hollywood was poised to embark in unprecedented numbers and at unprecedented 
expense over the next two decades.  
 
Coda: The Nuclear Alternative 
I have tried to show that the adoption of the word ‘blockbuster’ into film-industry 
discourse was occasioned by the context of industry conflict and aggressive 
competition between media for both economic dominance and audience loyalty at a 
time of great instability in the field of entertainment. It could reasonably be asked 
why, given the usual ephemerality of slang terms, it has survived to remain in 
common use for more than sixty years. Why have alternative, more up-to-date words 
not emerged to replace it, at least in common parlance? One reason, I would suggest, 
is precisely that the original meaning of the term, its etymological root, has been 
forgotten, making its appropriation by colloquial, industrial and indeed academic 
discourse all the easier. Even by the 1950s awareness of its original sense was fading, 
and this was seemingly a condition for its subsequent ubiquity. The point is made 
clearer if we briefly compare it to another postwar expression which has not survived. 
     Intermittently throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, ‘atomic’ was used in 
Variety as an adjective to describe the power of particular performers or films. For 
example, the earnings of The Outlaw (1943) on its long-delayed release in Los 
Angeles were said to be an ‘Atomic 70G’; Broadway columnist Radie Harris referred 
to the imminent return to the ‘Gay White Way’ of tempestuous star ‘atomic Tallulah’ 
Bankhead; Martin and Lewis were said to be ‘readying an atomic sock’ for an 
upcoming nightclub appearance; and a headline reported ‘Broadway Biz in Atomic 
Boom’ over the New Year holiday of 1949-50.49 But these were atypical iterations of 
a word that was more commonly, and extensively, used in its literal sense to refer to 
developments in the use and abuse of nuclear fission. Although there was an 
abundance of explosive imagery in trade advertising around this time – such as 
references to United Artists’ The Sound of Fury (1950) making a ‘Boom at the 
Boxoffice’ and He Ran All the Way (1951) as ‘Boxoffice Dynamite’; or MGM’s Lone 
Star (1952) being ‘Box-office Combustion’ and Somebody Up There Likes Me (1956) 
‘Bursting on the Industry like a Bomb-Shell!’50 – references to the more topical 
nuclear bomb were scarce except where the subject demanded it. This was the case 
with Republic’s serial The Purple Monster Strikes (1945), concerning a secret 
weapon: ‘See ... the “Electro-Annihilator” at work ... disintegrating all before it ... as 
it harnesses the tremendous energy of the sun ... just like the ATOMIC BOMB!’. The 
serial itself was further said to possess ‘the power of an Atomic Bomb’.51 
     When the film industry launched its own ‘secret weapons’, in the form of the 
various new screen technologies of the 1950s, their description in the trade press 
sometimes invoked nuclear analogies. Todd-AO, the 70mm widescreen process 
developed by the American Optical Co. for showman Mike Todd, was said to have 
been called ‘the T-bomb of the picture business’ by interested exhibitors.52 In the field 
of popular music, a trade advertisement placed by RCA Victor Records for singer 
Tony Martin proclaimed ‘New “M” Bomb Explodes! Tony Gets Direct Hit ...’.53 Yet 
again, these are not at all typical. I would suggest that the very immediacy of the 
threat posed by the atomic bomb in the age of nuclear anxiety prevented such 
vocabulary and its associated imagery catching on except as an occasional gimmick 
and that protocols of taste and tact militated against their continued use. The call by 
Robert M. Weitman, vice-president of United Paramount Theatres, ‘for the film 
industry to “set off its own atomic bomb” in the entertainment world in order to 
rekindle public interest in theatre-going’54 must have seemed insensitive even in 1950. 
‘Blockbuster’, however, though its literal namesake undoubtedly caused a greater loss 
of life than the A-bomb during the years of its active use in World War Two, was 
ultimately rendered safe not only by the fact of its obsolescence as a military weapon, 
but also by its very pervasiveness as an expression during the postwar period. 
Continual use detached the word from its linguistic origins and ensured that it came to 
be associated primarily with popular entertainment in general and with the big-budget, 
high-impact Hollywood hit in particular. 
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